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FRANÇOIS LARUELLE VE (STANDART OLMAYAN) 
İLETİŞİM 
Öz 
İletişim ve medya alanlarında François Laruelle’in çalışmasından pek sık söz edilmez. Bu araştırma notları, 
bu kesişimin üç noktasının ana hatlarını çıkarmayı önerir. İlk olarak, Laruelle’in özellikle iletişim üzerine 
yazdığı kısa bir deneme ele alınacaktır. Söz konusu denemeye hızlıca bir genel bakışın yanı sıra, felsefe için 
olmayan-felsefe neyse, iletişim için de –pek çok yazar tarafından dile getirildiği gibi- bir modelin 
halihazırda varolduğu öne sürülmektedir. Bu model “standart olmayan iletişim” olarak ifade edilmiştir. 
Bu noktadan sonra çalışma,  standart olmayan iletişimin Laruelle’in olmayan-felsefesi ile kesiştiği, iki ilave 
yol önerisiyle devam etmektedir. İlk kesişim, standart olmayan iletişimin kendisinin dışında hiçbir şeyle 
iletişim kurmadığı gerçeğinde yatmaktadır. İkinci kesişimdeyse standart olmayan iletişim, iki fail arasında 
yer almaktan çok bu failliğin en başta nasıl meydana geldiğiyle ilişkilidir.  
 
Anahtar Terimler 
İletişim, Laruelle, felsefe, ifade edilemezlik, medya, topluluk 
 
 
To this day, the work of François Laruelle is not often mentioned in the fields of 
communication and media studies. In the brief research notes that follow, I propose to 
quickly outline three points of possible intersection. First, I revisit a very short essay 
Laruelle wrote specifically about communication. In doing so, I show that his 
understanding of what theories of communication are is based on the linear model of 
transmission. While this model alone does not the account for all those developed in 
communication and media studies, it can be said to represent a “standard” model. I 
suggest that, aside from Laruelle’s short critique of this standard model of 
communication, there already exists a conception shared by various authors that could 
be, for communication, what non-philosophy is for philosophy. I call this model “non-
standard communication”. I proceed to offer two ways in which this non-standard 
communication intersects with Laruelle’s non-philosophy. I identify the first intersection 
in the fact that non-standard communication does not separate between truth and its 
manifestation. Non-standard communication, in this light, does not communication 
anything else then itself. The second intersection has to do with agency or the lack of 
thereof. Non-standard communication does not take place between two agents but is 
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revealed to be the event of agency in the first place. In lieu of a conclusion, I suggest 
further avenues of development that could contribute to a renewed understanding of 
both communication and the uncommunicable. 
 
Two Hermes for François Laruelle 
In this very short text first published in French in 1987 as “La vérité selon Hermès”, French 
philosopher François Laruelle suggests that the “dominant way of thinking” is 
characterized by the “Hermeto-logical Difference”: that is “the undecidable coupling of 
truth and communication” (2010, p. 19). Communication, in that sense, is the process by 
which truth is made manifest to human beings, either as accessible (as logos) or as 
inaccessible (as a “supposed secret”). It belongs to the “unitary” way of thinking which, 
historically, is the thinking “of Being, then of Difference” (2010, p. 21). This thinking is 
furthermore characterized by the forgetting of the “essence of the One”. In the essay, it is 
personified by a “greco-Western Hermes” (2010, p. 21). One could say about this Hermes 
what Laruelle says later about the “unitary philosopher”: he is a “servant of the Postal 
and Telecommunication Ministry; a transmitter and decoder of hermetological 
Difference”, a mailman of truth (2010, p. 21). Laruelle believes the “Hermeto-logical 
Difference” is a “matrix for what is called “metaphysics” in general” (2010, p. 20). That is 
why he thinks that this dominant way of thinking is more powerful than “all possible 
theories of communication”1: 
The hermeto-logical circle is deeper and more original than the “hermeneutic 
circle.” Hermeto-logical Difference is a fundamental invariant, a matrix for what is called 
“metaphysics” in general. It is more powerful than its modalities or avatars, among which 
the hermeneutics conflict of interpretations, as well as the textual and signifying critique 
within hermeneutics, and all possible theories of communication (2010, p. 20). 
Laruelle calls the “One” or the “Real” the principle that is prior to this economy of 
difference. “Non-philosophy” is his attempt to develop an understanding of this 
principle. For all that, non-philosophy is not a theory of philosophy, nor its dialectical 
opposite: such a view would simply amount to another iteration of the philosophical 
decision2. 
                                                     
1 This broad, sweeping statement echoes similar ones, often repeated by Laruelle, that distinguishe non-
philosophy “from all philosophies” (Laruelle, 2013, p. 49; Mullarkey and Smith, 2012, pp. 6-7). 
2 François Laruelle once acknowledged the expression “non-philosophy” could, in that sense, create some 
confusion. Since he has proposed to call what he is invested in “non-standard philosophy”: “Maybe the 
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In his short essay, Laruelle also points to another communication. This “mode” of 
communication is not reducible to the “unitary” way of thinking. Indeed, next to [“à côté”] 
the common Hermes, there exists another Hermes. This less obvious Hermes personifies 
a secret that is not dialectically determined by the potential manifestation of an alliance 
between truth and meaning, as it is the case with the communicable secret mentioned 
earlier. Laruelle is insistant of that point: this secret “has never appeared in the horizon 
of presence” (2010, p. 20). However paradoxical this may seem (it is not), this absence is 
the very effect of the secret’s positive essence (2010, p. 20). Another way to put it would 
be to say that the second Hermes carries no proposal of alliance and, as such, that he is 
the messenger of nothing, except maybe of his own mode of messaging (2010, p. 21). “The 
secret,” writes Laruelle, “is index sui prior to any indication” (2010, 20). “Index sui,” 
meaning the secret, as secret, marks itself before being an indication of something else, 
and before referring to or representing something else. 
This is a reference to the principle mentioned in Spinoza’s 74th letter addressed to 
Albert Burdh at the end of 1675: “For the truth is the index of itself and of what is false” 
(1889, p. 417)3. This idea, which Spinoza expresses more than once in different forms can 
be traced back to Aristotle’s treatise On the Soul: “by that which is straight we discern 
both straight and crooked” (1986, 61). The Christian tradition offers a variation of 
something similar in Mark 8:12: “He sighed deeply and said, ‘Why does this generation 
ask for a sign? Truly I tell you, no sign will be given to it.’” (in the New International 
version)4. Laruelle certainly remains consistently critical of what he describes as Spinoza’s 
so-called immanence (1999, p. 141; 2013, pp. 124–125). However, he also makes consistent 
use of the “index sui” principle. Since at least the end of the 1970s, he used the principle 
in relation to science, the Real, and linguistics. In his 1978 piece “Toward an Active 
Linguistics (The Notion of Phonesis),” Laruelle discussed the possibility for “speaking” 
to become “index sui” if its instrumental conception was to be rendered inoperative, hence 
allowing us to understand speech “as the speaking of language” (2013b). The same 
principle allowed Laruelle to argue that science “furnishes on its own the means and 
above all else the immanent rules of its description” (2016, p. 43). That science is “index 
                                                     
term non-philosophy is too problematic, induces either fear or amusement, whereas “non-standard 
philosophy” would be just as evocative and more open, while remaining anchor in a closure or a “no”, 
resolutely inevitable (my translation, 2009). 
3 In the original Latin, “Est enim verum index sui et falsi” (1844, p. 351). 
4 To learn more about the rich tradition the Spinozist expression “index sui” is inherited from, see the 
instructive study of Frédéric Manzini, which some of the present indications borrow from (2010). 
  
 
(19) 
Philippe Theophanidis Moment Journal, 2018, 5(1): 15-30 
sui” is something Laruelle insists upon on a number of occasions (2015, p. 26; 2017, p. 67). 
However, to be precise, it should be noted that Laruelle makes use of the Spinozist 
principle while criticizing the decision that traditionally separates immanence from 
transcendence. In Principle of Non-Philosophy, he evokes the “Spinozist motif” while 
expressing the need for “radicalizing it”. Indeed, in Laruelle’s hands, “index sui” cannot 
be said to be immanent or transcendent. As a criterion, it is rather immanently 
transcendental5. For instance, while “the immanence of the Real is index sui,” it is also the 
case that, in regard to science, “index sui” can be described as a transcendent criterion in 
so far as it is rigorously immanent (2015, p. 26). Laruelle further insisted on his 
radicalization of the Spinozist motif by underlining how “index sui” can operate on its 
own without the need to relate to the false. He thus rejects decisive interpretations which 
use the motif as a differentiating principle by “plac[ing] the index veri et falsi solely in the 
et of this formula” (2010b, p. 205). In other words, the fact that the false exists does not 
mean the “index sui” motif relies on it. In Theory of Identities, the false is identified by 
Laruelle with philosophy and –just as important for the topic at hand– representation 
(2016, pp. 43, 193). 
It is possible to understand how the second Hermes’s incommunicable secret has 
no need for the kind of communication that is the object of the usual theories of exchange, 
of meaning, of transmission, etc. Instead, this secret should be understood as being prior 
to “all possible theories of communication” (2010, p. 20). That is why Laruelle provides it 
with its “own mode” (“son mode propre”) of communication which allows it to determine 
“the communicational games in the last instance” (2010, p. 21). Although Laruelle does 
not use this expression, it would be coherent to argue this special mode of communication 
is to communication the way non-philosophy is to philosophy: a “non-communication” 
or a “non-standard communication”. As non-philosophy does not oppose philosophy, 
Laruelle second Hermes does not oppose Hermes-the-messenger. If it were the case, there 
still be a coupling through contradiction, whereas between the two Hermes, writes 
Laruelle, there is no conflict, no war, perhaps not even a ‘dialogue’ ” (2010: 21). 
In light of all this, one understands that not all communications fall under the 
“Hermeto-logical Difference”, although “all theories” of communication may very well 
do, especially when they are understood as theories of transmission, of meaning, of 
exchange, etc. In other words, Laruelle holds a rather specific understanding of what “all 
                                                     
5 It would be interesting to compare Laruelle’s non-decisional thought on immanence and transcendence 
with Jean-Luc Nancy’s conception of “transimmanence” (Gratton and Morin, 2015, pp. 232-234). 
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possible theories of communication” can be. In what follows, it will be suggest this 
common –but quite narrow– understanding of communication-as-exchange is also 
shared by some of his commentators. 
Without fully diving into non-philosophy, it remains possible to identify points of 
contact between Laruelle’s special mode of communication –what I have tentatively 
labelled “non-standard communication”–, and a unique paradigm of communication 
explored various authors in recent times. The point being this other conception of 
communication, although not quite common, does not belong to a single author not a 
specific school of thought, but can be traced back in the work of various thinkers. If there 
is a common thread between those thinkers, it may be found in the attempt to think 
human co-existence after the withdrawal of the traditional foundation upon which a 
humanity was once conceived. 
Georges Bataille, Jean-Luc Nancy, Maurice Blanchot, Giorgio Agamben and 
Roberto Esposito all explored such another understanding of communication. Together 
they share strongly coherent lines of thought, and often explicitly refer to one another. 
Among other aspects, their understanding of communication is not grounded in the 
dialectical coupling of differences. It is neither the means to an end, nor the sharing of 
something. It precedes human agency, and possibility any kind of agency in general. In 
so many words: it is a conception of communication without exchange. For the purpose 
of these research notes, the examination will focus on the work of Bataille, Nancy, and 
Esposito. In presenting those points of contact, I am not suggesting that those authors are 
“Laruellians”, nor that Laruelle’s “non-philosophy” can be merged into a broader 
tradition of thinking. 
Incommunicability: Communication without exchange 
Laruelle’s essay was translated into English in 2010 by Alexander Galloway, who 
discussed it the same year in the fifth session of his seminar French Theory Today – An 
Introduction to Possible Futures, at the Public School New York. Galloway’s lectures were 
made available in five “Pamphlets” which also include special contributions from 
various guests (2010a). For the session on Laruelle, published in the fifth pamphlet, 
Eugene Thacker also addresses Laruelle’s essay on Hermes in his contribution: 
All philosophy, says Laruelle, subscribes to the “communicational 
decision,” that everything that exists can be communicated. In this self-
inscribed world, all secrets exist only to be communicated, all that is not-
said is simply that which is not-yet-said. (2010, p. 24) 
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In the mid-60s, the Palo Alto school put forward a similar view. In Paul 
Watzlawick’s Pragmatics of Human Communication, the very first axiom clearly posits “the 
impossibility of not communicating” or, to put it another way, that “one cannot not 
communicate” (1967, pp. 48-51). However, while Watzlawick et al. studied the problems 
of human communication, they were not concerned with what allows communication to 
be a reality for human beings in the first place, whether as a process of relation or 
separation. This blind spot in their investigation is precisely what allows them to see 
communication everywhere. Watzlawick et al. were specifically interested in behavioral 
communication (1967, p. 50). Although their views certainly do not represent all theories 
of communication –notoriously diversified–, one can understand how they could be 
associated with a common, dominant conception of communication. 
The ideas shared by Galloway and Thacker in 2010 were later expanded in a book 
they coauthored with McKenzie Wark. Excommunication: Three Inquiries in Media and 
Mediation (2014) contains one essay by each of the three authors. As their programmatic 
introduction makes clear, the perspectives they propose to explore are significantly 
informed by Laruelle’s ideas. This is worth mentioning, as it currently remains one of the 
very few attempts to bring non-philosophy to the field of communication and media 
studies. 
In the book, Galloway, Thacker and Wark do not refer to Watzalwick et al. Instead, 
when it comes to commenting on Laruelle’s ideas, they discuss the linear model of 
communication. They chose to understand “the elements of the modern 
communicational apparatus” as “sender, receiver, channel, message” (2014, p.19). The 
field of communication and media studies is widely diversified, to the point that its limits 
are notoriously fuzzy. Furthermore, as Robert T. Craig once remarked “the transmission 
model, as usually presented, is scarcely more than a straw figure set up to represent a 
simplistic view” (1999, p. 127). Its notoriety is proportional to the amount of criticism it 
has been subjected to –rightly or not– since its inception. It is without a doubt an easy 
target, sharing this predicament with Claude Shannon’s mathematical model of 
information transmission published around the same time (1948). Certainly, efforts are 
being made to revise the predominant perceptions pertaining to Lasswell’s model 
(Sapienza, Iyer and Veenstra, 2015). Similar concerns motivated the activity of a recent 
workshop organized by the European Communication Research and Education 
Association in Vilnius, on the topic of “Models of communication: Theoretical and 
Philosophical Approaches”: 
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It is often claimed that the early phases of media and communication 
studies were dominated by a linear conception of communication, 
modelled as a process of transmission. The hegemony of this model may 
have been exaggerated – it never prevailed in studies of interpersonal 
communication, for instance – but it has undeniably provided a favourite 
target for critics of various stripes. (ECREA Philosophy of Communication, 
2015). 
However simplistic, the principal elements of this transmission model of communication 
can be described as standard and canonical. They were already present in the analysis of 
oratory offered by Aristotle in his treatise Rhetoric (2006). Mass communication research 
emerges in the United States as a reworked version of this linear model (Lasswell, 1971). 
From this standpoint, communication as a means of exchange or transmission is a process 
employed toward an ideal end, usually represented by the transcendence of differences 
between individuals, or by mutual agreement or consensus. Thus, it is evident how 
models based on this understanding can fall victim to Laruelle’s contested 
“hermetology”, as they split truth between a meaning and its transmission6. Inspired by 
Laruelle, Galloway, Thacker and Wark consequently propose “to move beyond” the 
limits of this canonical conception of communication. Hence they make their proposal for 
“excommunication” as a way to “push media and communication theory further” (2014, 
pp. 20–21). By venturing beyond the difference between communication and 
incommunicability, they show how it is possible to cross the threshold of the hegemonic 
model of mediation. They shed light on the possibility of yet another way to think about 
communication, one which I choose to name “non-standard communication”.  
Indeed, such efforts have been made outside the fields of communication and 
media studies. Georges Bataille is well known for having proposed a view of what could 
be called a “communication without exchange”, as it is called by François Bizet (2007). 
The formula is reminiscent of one of the many aporetic ways in which Bataille described 
his project: “Profound communication demands silence” (1988, p. 92).  This “negative” 
horizon of Bataille’s communication far from being an esoteric glitch or a mere literary 
artifice had and still has a strong legacy (Libertson, 1982; Collier, 1975; Besnier, 1991; 
Mitchell et Winfree, 2009). In the past three decades, they were significantly and 
coherently developed by authors such as Jean-Luc Nancy (1991), Maurice Blanchot 
                                                     
6 A rigorous proposition to rehabilitate the transmission model can be found in Sybille Krämer’s Medium, 
Messenger, Transmission: An Approach to Media Philosophy (2015). 
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(1988), Giorgio Agamben (1993) and Roberto Esposito (2010). Those authors have in turn 
proposed a unique take on communication which is reminiscent, in some aspects, of 
Laruelle’s special mode of communication. 
This view is very much concerned, in one way or another, with the communication 
of incommunicability or, to use Nancy’s words, with the fact that “the incommunicable 
communicates” (2002, p. 8). For the matter at hand here, “incommunicability” should not 
be understood as a predicate of communication: it does not stem from a (failed) process 
of communication. For example, it is not the same as the incommunicability of Kant’s 
noumenon, which still manifests itself as an inaccessible secret. Instead, the 
incommunicability at hand here actually communicates no-thing: a gap, a 
groundlessness, an opening, the lack of anything. 
Understandably, this incommunicability cannot be confused with the inherent 
ambiguity of the communicative process either. The fact that communication both unites 
and separates –this “duplicity”, as Thacker calls it in his essay which is also concerned 
with incommunicability– is still often presented as a dialectical process, especially when, 
among other things, it is subordinated to a positive end (indeed, an ideal end: the 
successful communication). 
Instead, this incommunicability is prior to this ambiguity, and prior to 
communication itself, when one understands “communication” as the common, 
canonical way discussed above. In some respects, it could be another name for Laruelle’s 
second Hermes, whose secret “is itself the Uninterpretable from which interpretation 
emerges” (2010, p. 20). 
Community: Communication without agents7 
The communication of incommunicability is not an exchange: it does not happen between 
agents of communication who would exist prior to its taking place. The question of 
agency is another potential point of contact between Laruelle and the non-standard 
communication one can find in the work of Nancy, Agamben and Esposito, even if –or 
especially as– they are dealing with the topic of community. As Galloway explains in his 
2010 lecture, putting aside the “human agent”, “receptive perceiver” or “human 
perceiver” is an important requisite for non-philosophy: a way to contest the dominance 
of the “Hermeto-logical Difference” (2010b, pp. 7-8). 
                                                     
7 I have further explored the idea of a communication without agent in another journal article (Choukah 
and Theophanidis, 2016). 
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Bataille’s understanding of communication makes a very unique use of human 
agency. Thacker picks up on this aspect in his chapter of the book Excommunication: 
Whenever Bataille speaks of communication or mediation, his reference 
is always that of the mystical tradition of the via negativa; for him 
mediation and communication always imply the dissolution of sender 
and receiver, leaving perhaps only the message that is the gulf or abyss 
between them. (2014, p. 136) 
That being said, communication without agency does not mean that we get rid of the 
problem of coexistence; quite the contrary. Bataille was notoriously concerned with the 
problem of community. Contre-Attaque, Acéphale and the Collège de sociologie were all 
laborious attempts at confronting human coexistence as the very tragic problem it had 
become in the middle of the 20th century. Nancy, Blanchot, Agamben and Esposito 
respectively, and very consciously, picked up on this problem where Bataille had left it. 
Given what is at stake, how could their views on communication do without human 
agency or, as Galloway puts it in his 2010 lecture, without the “fluff of human mediation” 
(2010, p. 9)? 
It is possible precisely because all those attempts refuse to ignore the fascist 
catastrophe of World War II. This research on community takes place in a historical 
horizon where human exceptionalism is severely brought into question as a guiding 
principle for human coexistence. This is clearly manifest in The Inoperative Community, an 
important book Nancy wrote after spending a year teaching the work of Bataille, in the 
early 80s. When it comes to the nature of the community, Nancy writes: 
it is not obvious that the community of singularities is limited to “man” 
and excludes, for example, the “animal” (even in the case of “man” it is 
not a fortiori certain that this community concerns only “man” and not 
also the “inhuman” or the “superhuman,” […]) (1991, p. 28). 
To a certain extent, Nancy’s remark is reminiscent of the way Laruelle understands non-
philosophy. After all, a “non-human” take on communication could not be understood 
as the opposite of an anthropocentric perspective, but rather as the deactivation of the 
dialectical operation by which the human exists in a differential opposition to something 
else (animals, things). The critique of anthropocentrism does not require us to get rid of 
humans. This is what allows Nancy to list together, at the very beginning of Being Singular 
Plural, “(…) all things, all beings, all entities, everything past and future, alive, dead, 
inanimate, stones, plants, nails, gods—and “humans” (…)” (2000, p. 3). The process of 
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“indifferenciation” used by Agamben to deactivate the dialectical process at work in the 
“anthropological machine” has already been compared to Laruelle’s non-philosophie 
(Agamben, 2004; Watkin, 2014, p. xvii, footnote 4). 
The fact that there is a kind of communication that is prior to any form of agency 
can still be illustrated in another manner. In Communitas, Roberto Esposito suggests a 
revision of the Heideggerian formula Es gibt sein in order to address a special kind of 
“donation” or munus: one that is entirely constituted by a “with” (2010, p. 90-91). 
Following Nancy’s re-reading of Being and Time, Esposito further explains that “all that 
exists, coexists” (2010, p. 93; see also Nancy, 1993). In other words, what is given through 
the munus is the cum, and not “something” in particular: no essence, no meaning, no 
information. Not only is nothing given –except coexistence– but no agent is responsible 
for the “donation” as well: the given is without givenness. It is, as Derrida once wrote a 
“giving that gives but without giving anything and without anyone giving anything” 
(1992, p. 20)8.  
On this basis, one could probably argue that while there is (Es gibt, or in French il y 
a) communication, this non-standard communication is actually prior to any agency, 
whoever or whatever they may be. Instead, this communication is how agency takes 
place in the first place: it is how “we” take place. As such, non-standard communication, 
while communicating no-thing except its own incommunicability, is nonetheless that by 
which the frail event that is community happens, endlessly. 
 (Not even) a “dialogue” 
Far from presenting a complete model of non-standard communication, these brief 
research notes call for much-needed further development. At the very least, they suggest 
the extent to which Laruelle’s non-philosophy could be of interest to those thinking about 
communication and incommunicability in a different light. The question remains to 
properly weight how non-standard communication should become –or, even more to the 
point, if it could become– an object of inquiry within the fields of communication and 
media studies. On principle, a non-standard model may very well require a precarious 
existence at the threshold of established disciplines, teetering between the knowable and 
the unknowable. This movement may be like thinking itself, a process of continuous 
estrangement which nonetheless requires the familiar it keeps moving away from. 
                                                     
8 How exactly does Laruelle’s own “don sans donation” (given-without-givenness) differs from the Es 
gibt of munus is a question that would be worth further inquiry. 
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If this endless journey is to continue, a number of issues require further consideration. 
First and foremost, a more systematic attempt should be made to assess the function 
fulfilled by Laruelle’s conception of communication in his overall philosophy. The 
authors associated with non-standard communication likewise demand a more careful 
examination. This needs to be done with concern not only for the various ways they 
explicitly deal with the idea of communication, but also to examine how they differ from 
one another, as well as from Laruelle’s own understanding of communication. The non-
standard model –if it is to be called a model at all– must also be further differentiated 
from specific “standard” models, as they are widely studied and used in the fields of 
communication and media studies. Special attention must be given to “standard” models 
of transmission and mediation, and to the ways they have been challenged either from 
within the established fields or at their margins. This will highlight more precisely how 
and if those fields could indeed benefit from an encounter with Laruelle, or if, as he 
suggested in his short piece on communication, between them “perhaps not even a 
‘dialogue’” is possible. The latter does not necessarily constitute a negative result. Such a 
“failure to communicate” could, after all, help to distinguish between communication 
theories and the philosophy of communication, especially in light of a renewed 
understanding of both communication and the uncommunicable. 
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